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This paper has its origin in the preparations for the 
extraordinary session on Latin America and Caribbean development 
convened by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) at the behest of the President of Mexico, in recognition of the 
"... complexity, magnitude, and relative novelty of the problems we are 
jointly facing ..." in the global economic crisis. Accordingly, the 
President asked ECLAC, which has "... a historic legacy and great 
tradition of clear and independent thinking ..." to re-evaluate its 
developmental policies and to provide "a current conceptual framework 
relevant to the problems of the region".
The call for a re-evaluation of the developmental policy framework 
is justified by the rapid changes occurring in the global economy, the 
consequent economic shocks suffered by Latin American and Caribbean 
countries since the early 1970s, and the extreme difficulties which 
they all are experiencing in adjusting to those shocks.
Of concern also is the suspicion that the adjustment process in 
the region, which is having to take place in an environment of 
stagnating world trade and rapidly changing patterns of production and 
of demand, is proceeding at a pace which is slower than that of many of 
its international competitors, so that its relative standing as a 
region is being eroded. Moreover, there is concern that some of the 
policies which have been pursued in the past have rendered the 
economies less resilient in the face of global changes, that might have 
been anticipated.
For the Caribbean members of the Caribbean Development and Co­
operation Committee (CDCC)1 concerns cire particularly acute, since the 
availability of hard currency, and therefore earnings from the export 
of goods and services, determines to a large extent the level of 
economic growth. The ECIAC/CDCC office has accordingly been monitoring 
economic performance and the process of structural adjustment in the 
region, while at the same time implementing a programme of co-operation 
designed to meet seme of their more pressing needs. '
The original notes which were prepared by ECIAC/CDCC were intended 
to provide a Caribbean input into the preparations for the 
extraordinary session. They attempted to outline some of the policy 
constraints faced by the smaller island economies in the Caribbean, and 
to provide a brief sketch of seme of those policies which have recently
1 It is not the intention to argue that a separate economic 
discipline applies to small states, but rather to suggest that for 
certain structural reasons they have fewer options in determining a 
developmental path than might otherwise be the case.
been enunciated by various Caribbean governments and institutions. The 
notes have subsequently been revised to incorporate the views of some 
Caribbean economists2 and to include the main themes of relevance to 
the Caribbean which emanated from the session itself.
By way of illustrating the inpact of the crisis on Caribbean 
economies, data are also included from research conducted within the 
Caribbean office of ECLAC particularly a recently completed study 
entitled "An Evaluation of Economic Performance of CDCC countries for 
the Period 1974-1984"3. Subsequent developments highlighting attempts 
to adjust to the crisis are also adumbrated.
Time and space do not permit a discussion of the inpact of the 
economic crisis upon the delivery of social services, and the social 
and institutional measures which will be needed to complement the 
current economic policies, if they are to be sustainable. These issues 
are however considered by ECLAC to be crucial and work has started to 
provide a better evaluation of the inpact of the crisis on social 
services in the region, beginning initially with the health services.
2 ECLAC/CDCC Meeting on Caribbean Development Issues and 
Policies, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 14 November 1986.
3 "An Evaluation of Economic Performance of CDCC Countries (1974- 
1984)" LC/CAiyG.182, dated 1 March 1986.
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JMERDDUCJTTOH AND SUMMARY
1. During the past fifteen years, the global economy has consolidated 
itself as truly global. It has at the same time been in rapid and 
profound change and has created a series of crises in those countries, 
or within those sectors least able to perceive the direction of change, 
and to adjust to it. Hie Caribbean represents one such area of crisis.
2. Hie impact of the global economy was felt in the Caribbean in a 
number of ways, and as early as 1974 for those most seriously affected 
by the oil price increases4. By the early 1980s, however, all 
countries of the region had been suffering adversely from a series of 
global economic developments which included:
(a) Oil priçe shocks of 1973-74, and 1979-80;
(b) A reduction in the demand for raw materials and other exporte, 
of Caribbean countries consequent upon deflationary adjustment policie: 
and rapid technological changes in the developed countries;
(c) The impact of high interest rates upon the debt and its 
servicing;
(d) The contraction of those economies in the region bene fitting 
from the petroleum trade and the consequent spinoff activities; and
(e) A shift in the terms of trade against raw materials exporters 
as a result of the continued sluggishness of the industrial countries, 
but also and more significantly because of the reduced intensity of raw 
materials inputs into industrial output, a shift 'which has 
disadvantaged raw materials producers and favoured efficient 
manufacturers and other possessors of high technology.
3. The structure of Caribbean economies has been evolving in various 
ways during the period under review.
4. Agriculture has recorded a decline in its contribution to GDP, now 
contributing on average 15%, from about 18%. The sector has shown a 
decline not only in its capacity to sustain export earnings but also to 
meet domestic food needs, so that the food import bill has grown and 
the region has become a net importer of food.
5. Manufacturing has stagnated, for the region as a whole, averaging 
about 13% of GDP over the ten-year period. The broad aggregates, 
however, disguise a shift in orientation, from a focus on local and
4 Some of the data series have accordingly tried to provide 
information from 1974, although the main emphasis in subsequent tables 
has been for the period 1980-1985.
2
regional markets to third country exports, in an attempt to reduce 
their reliance on the stagnating regional economies. It has also 
concealed the growth of manufacturing in some of the smaller countries.
6. Minerals producers in , the region have suffered from the 
uncertainties attendant in the global economy, with a structural shift 
away from raw materials consumption underlying the more familiar 
cyclical changes. Rapid price rises for petroleum and other raw 
materials in the early seventies were followed by a second price rise 
for petroleum in 1979-1980, although this fillip was a short duration 
and not extended to bauxite/alumina prices which had started to decline 
by the late seventies. Earnings from both raw materials have declined 
significantly since.
7. Services have grown in importance over the survey period, 
particularly tourism which is now a major activity, and is be inc .
actively encouraged in most countries. Other services which have showi 
a significant capacity to generate income have, however, suffered from 
the vicissitudes of the international economy, particularly those 
linked to the petroleum economy, and financial services which are 
vulnerable to changes in foreign legislation.
8. Given the trends in global demand and in domestic performance, 
deep seated structural problems have surfaced in most Caribbean 
economies, with chronic deficits being recorded in the fiscal and 
external accounts, rapidly increasing debt, and high levels of 
unemployment.
9. Domestic economic policy has been oriented to reducing imports and 
increasing exports, the former having a severe contractionary effect in 
the absence of immediate increases in exports. Efforts c u re  also being 
made to reduce the fiscal deficit, although this is particularly 
difficult in the light of stagnating revenues, the difficulties in 
contracting government services below a given minimum in the smallest 
countries, and the increasing cost of servicing the debt. At the same 
time efforts are being made to restructure the productive sectors to 
increase output and employment and to make them more resilient in the 
external markets. This effort is being hampered by a lack of 
investment, both domestic and foreign, and a lack of sufficient and 
timely information about processes and markets.
10. External economic policy has been oriented primarily towards 
maximizing the returns from stagnating traditional exports by 
negotiating special arrangements regarding their supply and price, 
while at the same time negotiating favourable access conditions for 
potential new products which will ultimately replace them. Limited 
success has so far,been achieved in the production of non-traditional 
items which are experiencing greater difficulty in penetrating export 
markets than had been anticipated. Rapid growth is however, being 
experienced in the assembly of garments in special enclave export 
processing zones.
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11. Regional trade nevertheless continues to be accorded a high 
priority, since it remains one of the few options over which the 
countries of the region retain a major degree of control. It is seen 
as a complement to the export oriented policies since it has the effect 
of compensating for limited domestic markets, thus enhancing the 
capacity of regional producers to penetrate global markets. The full 
potential of the regional market is as yet not fully realized, since it 
is still limited in its geographic scope, it is currently suffering 
from inadequate payments arrangements, thus limiting the flow of trade, 
and revised policies are needed to facilitate a smoother flow and more 
effective use of productive factors within the region.
I. IMPACT OF THE BOGNCHIC CRISIS CN THE SXTOCJURE 
AND PERFORMANCE OF CDCC ECDNCMIES
12. CDCC member ' countries are for the most part, small island 
developing states. Of the 20 members and associate members, all but 
three are islands, nine have land areas in excess of 1000 Km2 but of 
these only Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica and Trinidad 
and Tobago had populations of over 1 million persons in 1985 (Table 
1 . 1 ) .
13. There is a relatively wide variation in the size of CDCC member 
countries1 economies as measured by their Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
and in the relative incomes of their peqple as measured by per capita 
GDP. The following tentative analysis will try to illustrate these 
differences, and show how they have changed over time. Despite these 
differences, the economic structures are remarkably similar, as are the 
social and economic problems they all face.
14. In 1974, eight countries including all those now comprising the 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) had a GDP at current 
factor cost of about US$50 million or less, Montserrat being smallest 
with almost US$10 million. By 1984, all OECS member countries had a 
GDP in excess of US$50 million with the exception of Montserrat, and 
two OECS countries had a GDP in excess of US$100 million.
15. In 1974, most of the other CDCC countries had a GDP ranging 
between US$ 100 million and US$ 1,000 million with only Trinidad and 
Tobago, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Cuba exceeding that figure. 
By 1984, the Bahamas, Barbados, Haiti, Suriname and the Netherlands 
Antilles had joined that group of countries exceeding US$1,000 million,
t
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and three - the Dcaninican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago and Cuba - had 
exceeded US$ 8,000 million5.
16. The relative income of Caribbean people varied accordingly, in 
1974 ranging from Haiti with US$125 per capita in current prices to The 
Bahamas at over US$3,000. By 1985 this disparity had not changed 
US$7,800 per capita.
17. Growth of GDP also showed significant changes, from Trinidad and 
Tobago, a petroleum exporting country recording a real growth of 30? 
over the survey period to Jamaica, highly dependent upon importée 
petroleum for its energy, recording a decline in GDP of 15% over the 
same period (Table 2.1).
18. For the period 1980-1985, economic performance remained uneven, 
good growth performance being recorded for a number of countries, rapid 
growth recorded by Trinidad and Tobago in the seventies was not 
sustained in the first half of the decade of the eighties, reflecting 
the vagaries of the international petroleum market. Details of GDP 
performance for the period 1980-1985 are set out at Table 2.2.
IT. DECLINING AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT
19. Despite a measure of insulation from the vagaries of the
international market, due to special trading arrangements, the
agricultural sector has been unable to sustain its contribution to 
export earnings, or to the domestic product.
20. Agriculture consistently contributes in excess of 10% of GDP in 
eleven of the twenty countries surveyed, and for four it contributes 
20% or more of GDP. For the region as a whole the contribution of 
agriculture to the domestic product declined from 18% in 1974 to about 
15% ten years later. The sector has shown a decline in its relative 
capacity not only to earn foreign exchange but also to satisfy domestic 
food needs, so that the food import bill has grown and the region as a 
whole has become a net importer of food.
21. Production of major agricultural export staples has tended to
stagnate or decline over the survey period. Sugar production has shown 
a decline in Barbados (9%) Guyana (29%), Haiti (17%), Jamaica (50%), 
and Trinidad and Tobago (59%). It has remained constant in the
Dominican Republic but increased in Belize (16%), Cuba (38%), and Saint 
Christopher/Nevis (42%). In the case of Cuba, however, note needs to
5 Differing national accounting practices in Cuba result in 
figures which are not directly comparable with other CDCC members. The 
figures are, however, useful for illustrative purposes and for an 
examination of Cuban performance over time.
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be taken of the fact that production in 1970 exceeded the best year of 
the survey period.
22. While international demand for the primary products of developing 
countries has declined, particularly after the late seventies, CDCC 
countries, in the main, dispose of their sugar exports in preferential 
markets in the EEC, USA or CMEA6. Earnings were, therefore, neither at 
low nor as unstable as might have obtained if all sales were made at 
International Sugar Agreement prices. Emphasis in the analysis has, 
therefore, tended to focus on output since its decline is in the main 
attributable to organizational and production problems reflected in a 
failure to adapt and sustain productivity over time, rather than a 
response to the depressed world market. Similar comments also apply to 
seme of the older banana exporting countries.
23. Banana exports have registered growth in Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines (48%), and Saint lucia (48%), they grew in Grenada up to 
1979 but decreased thereafter to rest at slightly over the 1974 figure, 
but declined in Dominica (11%) and Jamaica (85%).
24. In the face pf declining performance of traditional agricultural 
exports, non-traditional agricultural exports constitute a potential 
source of export growth for Caribbean countries, based primarily on 
favourable growing conditions, competitive labour rates and close 
proximity to a large market on the east coast of the United States. 
The Dominican Republic and Jamaica have already made some progress in 
penetrating this market which falls into three basic categories. The 
longest established is the production of indigenous foods for the 
"ethnic market" which comprises mainly Hispanic and Caribbean 
populations. The second category, which encompasses a large and 
lucrative though seasonal market, comprises the cultivation of off­
season or winter vegetables. The third category is the year-round 
export of tropical products which have developed an international 
clientele, such as pineapple and coconut and its various by-products, 
aloe, cocoa butter, cut flowers, house plants and various spices. The 
possibility of processing and packaging a range of these products, 
either frozen or in cans, or in using them as raw materials for other 
final products, needs also to be included.
25. Difficulties and setbacks have, however, been experienced in 
penetrating this market, which is highly price competitive and quality 
conscious. Experience has shown that traditional methods of 
cultivation, and quality standards that are acceptable for the local' 
market are often inadequate to satisfy the export markets. Some of the
6 In 1985 Cuba disposed of 76% of its sugar exports to CMEA 
countries at special prices, from which it received 97% of its sugar 
export earnings. The Dominican Republic was also highly dependent upon 
the US market for its sugar exports, as are most other Caribbean sugar 
producers, though to a lesser extent. Recent quota reductions in the 
US have therefore impacted unfavourably on these countries.
6
more successful current operations are joint ventures, often having 
close links with the distribution outlets in the export market.
111. UNCERTAIN PERFXXWANCE IN MANUEACTURING
26. Manufacturing on average, accounted for about 13% of GDP for all 
CDCC countries at the beginning of the survey period. The larger 
countries had a more developed manufacturing sector with Cuba7 (47%), 
the Dominican Republic (17%), Haiti (16%) and the MDCs of CARICCM, 
Guyana (14%), Jamaica (18%) and Trinidad and Tobago (15%), having a 
higher than average contribution to GDP. Significantly below the 
average in 1974 were the smaller countries - Dominica (5%), Grenada, 
(5%), Saint Lucia (3%) and Montserrat (5%). By 1979, the relative 
contribution of the sector to GDP had not changed significantly and by 
1984, the average for the region had increased marginally to 13.5%. 
Concealed within the aggregates, however, were changes by some of the 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) countries which now 
tended to cluster around a 10% contribution compared with 5% at the 
beginning of the survey period, although in Antigua and Barbuda and 
Grenada manufacturing declined significantly. Other significant 
changes were recorded by Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Cuba. In 
the case of Trinidad and Tobago which does not include refining in 
manufacturing, the decline of the sector from 15% to 7% of GDP is a 
reflection more of the inability of manufacturing to keep pace with the 
very rapid increase in GDP rather than an absolute decline in the 
sector itself, while in Suriname it increased from 6% to 14%. Over the 
period the contribution of manufacturing in Cuba declined by five 
percentage points.
27. Efforts to expand manufacturing between the 1960s to the mid-1970s 
in the CARICOM countries, and between 1970-1978 in Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic, were based on import substitution policies within 
the context of a free trade area in the former countries, or their 
domestic markets in the latter two. The range of products has been 
relatively narrow and produced on a small scale, concentrating on food 
processing, garments, footwear, furniture and consumer durables. They 
have depended on imported inputs and have not for the most part been 
competitive in price, surviving as a result of protection. 
Consequently, linkages between products have been few and the capacity 
to penetrate export markets limited.
28. Since the mid-1970s some new products such as steel, extruded 
plastics, building materials, and chemicals have been added to the 
product mix. Yet, in the ensuing decade little additional progress has 
been made in the sector, as the domestic economies have contracted in 
the face of difficulties in the global economy, and as inputs to the 
industries such as packaging have increased in price or became
7 See footnote 5.
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unavailable due to foreign exchange shortages. Furthermore, CARICOM 
trade contracted due to the need to conserve foreign exchange and the 
industries have been rendered increasingly uncompetitive due to 
declining investment and outmoded plant and equipment. Similar 
patterns were evident in Haiti and the Dominican Republic as the 
domestic markets became saturated.
29. Concurrently, yet quite separately from the domestic manufacturing 
sector, the off-shore or export processing zones (EPZ) have developed 
in an attempt to produce for export markets, and circumvent some of the 
policy constraints which have sometimes rendered export production less 
attractive. ïhe most notable export processing zones have developed in 
Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Barbados and Jamaica.
30. The export assembly industries account for 30% of total 
manufacturing in Haiti, growth accelerating from the mid-1970s when 
import substitution industries began to stagnate. Hie principal 
product groups are clothing, electronics and electrical equipment, and 
sporting goods. In the Dominican Republic the EPZs concentrate mainly 
on textiles and garments (60%), footwear and leather products (12%), 
cigars and processed tobacco, and electronic goods. The zones have 
recorded an annual growth rate in the value of exports of 20% between 
1975-1980, and while the rate of growth since then has fluctuated the 
net value of exports exceeds the gross value of all other non- 
traditional exports. They provide employment for over 50,000 persons 
mostly women.
31. In Barbados industries dealing in textiles and clothing averaged 
39% growth between 1968-1978, although firms assembling electronic 
components grew almost as fast. By 1979 electronics had begun to grow 
faster than the garments sector and by 1980 it was larger in absolute 
terms. By 1983 electronics dominated export performance while the 
textiles and garments sector started to decline. By 1986, however, the 
electronics industry was experiencing difficulty and was in decline.
32. In Jamaica, the Kingston Free Zone was inaugurated in 1976 mainly 
as a warehousing and trans-shipment facility, and by 1980 export sales 
remained relatively modest. In the next four years export sales grew 
by about 240% per annum on average. Free zone activity is 
predominantly in the apparel industry (90%) the remainder in agro­
processing. Hie production of methanol is also a fast growing sector 
and as such has come up against varying industry lobbies to prevent its 
inclusion as a CBERA export. The free zone has had a rapid increase in 
output at a time when output has declined nationally and has provided 
increased employment at a time when sector employment has stagnated.
33. For seme of the smaller states, such as Antigua and Barbuda, 
Dominica, Grenada and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, exports to the 
U.S. comprise garments assembled from imported parts exclusively. 
Exports of garments to the U.S. in 1985 for the region as a whole 
amounted to US$455 million and while data are not available for 1985 in 
1984, the exports of assembled products mainly garments and
»
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electronics, and the main output of the free zones amounted to about 
28% of total exports to the U.S.8.
34. The contribution of the export processing zone to development, 
while not inconsiderable, is however limited since it is confined 
mainly to employment generation. Criticisms of such industries centre 
on the fact that they Eire volatile and shift rapidly whenever 
conditions in one locale deteriorate, or when costs become too high; 
and the fact that there is only limited integration into the domestic 
economy, so that intersectoral linkages are not established and the 
contribution to Gross Domestic Product is not maximized. The fact that 
investment seems only to be induced into areas which are relatively 
untouched by government policy should cause some reflection about these 
policies if it is the intention to induce foreign investment for the 
longer term.
35. Among the advantages listed for the EPZ is that:
(a) It provides a window on the export market giving putative 
exporters seme exposure to the training and quality control standards 
which will need to be maintained;
(b) Ensures access to distribution facilities;
(c) Provides its own mechanisms for preserving and sustaining the 
market share; and
(d) Is sensitive to shifting market trends and advancing 
technologies.
The EPZ can also provide the policy maker with a controlled 
experiment as to the measures needed to induce foreign investment, and 
a practical test of the relative productivity of a territory. It might 
also provide a basis on which to build a more mature export industry as 
has been demonstrated by some of the Newly Industrialized Countries 
(NICs).
36. At the same time it lias also been argued that dones tic structural 
adjustment programmes may be so stringent in the short run that 
investment is stifled unless it is insulated by measures such as the 
export processing zones. They are seen therefore as an interim measure 
until the structural adjustment programme is more mature and a more 
consistent and favourable set of investment policies can be put into 
place.
8 Data derived from US Department of Commerce, and excludes the 
exports of petroleum from Trinidad and reexports of petroleum from The 
Bahamas.
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IV . EXPOSURE OF H IE  MIRERAIS SECTOR
37. Being fully integrated into the intemationál markets for 
petroleum and aluminium, Caribbean producers and processors of these 
minerals have been fully exposed to the uncertainties of the global 
market, and in recent years, have-suffered a steady erosion in the 
earning capacity of these industries.
38. The bauxite/alumina industry in the Caribbean more closely 
reflects the tempo of world trade and shifting comparative advantage, 
than is the case of, say, the traditional agricultural products. The 
shifting fortunes in the bauxite/alumina industry, therefore, reflect 
the global demand for aluminium, which remained strong from 1974 to 
1980 and declined thereafter. This trend, which was first assumed to 
be cyclical, may be structural in that the level of raw material input 
per unit of manufacturing output has been declining, and particularly 
so in relationship to aluminium where plastics are providing 
substitutes in many applications. Moreover, a further structural 
change has taken place in the bauxite industry which shifted new 
investment to those areas of production having bauxite deposits in 
close juxtaposition to cheap and abundant energy. Suriname is the only 
CDCC producer currently benefitting from this advantage although Guyana 
has the potential to do so for the future. Bauxite/alumina production 
as a result of these factors is declining in the region.
39. By 1984 bauxite production had ceased in Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic. Over the survey period it has declined in Guyana by 57%, in 
Jamaica by 42%, and in Suriname by 30%.
40. Alumina production has ceased in Guyana. It has declined by 39% 
in Jamaica and has remained more or less constant in Suriname, the only 
other producer of alumina in the subregion.
41. Crude oil production in Trinidad and Tobago declined by 
approximately 20% over the period, although Barbados, which first 
extracted petroleum in commercial quantities in 1974, has steadily 
increased its output over the period. By 1984, its production exceeded 
50% of domestic consumption.
42. The petroleum sector in Trinidad and Tobago lias, over time, rested 
on the production of indigenous crude, a large portion of which was 
exported; and refining, the inputs of which were composed in part of 
domestic crude as well as imports, the latter segment being US off­
shore refining capacity and geared to supply the east coast of the 
United States. With changing energy policy in the United States to 
encourage conservation and discourage off-shore in favour of domestic 
refining, structural shifts in the industry also underlay the more 
obvious changes which occurred in the price of crude petroleum.
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43. lhe output of domestic crude oil in Trinidad and Tobago remained 
constant between 1974 and 1980 declining steadily thereafter to 1983 
though rebounding with a slight increase for 1984. Exports of domestic 
crude oil showed a similar trend, declining after 1980. Over the 
survey period the quantum of domestic crude refined locally has 
registered little change, while the off-shore component of the industry 
ceased after 1982. Reduced exports of refined products, however, now 
represent the product of domestic crude exclusively.
44. lhe contribution of the petroleum sector to GDP, which rested at 
20% in 1972, increased to 43% by 1974 due to the effects of the first 
oil price increase. After remaining relatively constant until 1977, it 
declined in 1978 and 1979 whereupon it was boosted to almost 42% by the 
second oil price increases in 1980. Since that period the contribution 
of the sector has declined as a result of reduced petroleum output as 
well as reduced prices, to rest in 1984 at a figure below that which 
obtained at the end of 1973.
45. Export intermediate refiiieries had so clustered in thé Caribbean 
by the mid-1970s that it contained the largest concentration of such 
facilities in the world9. Of this, CDCC countries had a net exportable 
capacity in excess of 2 million barrels per day (mbd) located at 
strategic deep water sites and exporting refined products to the United' 
States. The major facilities were in lhe Bahamas (432 tbpd)10, 
Netherlands Antilles (653 tbpd), Trinidad and Tobago (394 tbpd) and 
U.S. Virgin Islands (606 tbpd). If to this refining capacity is added 
trans-shipment capacity of 2.7 mbd, it is clear that the area provided 
a major conduit for petroleum products to the United States at the 
beginning of the survey period. By 1984 the situation facing off-shore 
facilities, refineries as well as trans-shipment facilities had changed 
drastically. In addition to conservation and the encouragement of 
domestic refineries, the sources of crude oil imports into the United 
States were shifted to favour non-OPEC producers and deep water 
facilities established in the Gulf of Mexico thus rendering off-shore 
trans-shipment facilities in the Caribbean obsolescent.
46. The largest refining facilities, located in the Netherlands 
Antilles, have registered declining output from the early 1970s, a 
decline which was arrested temporarily during the period 1975-1979. 
Thereafter, the decline continued so that by 1984, the largest refinery 
in Aruba (440) had closed and the continuation of the remaining 
refinery, was predicated on operation by Venezuela at reduced output. 
Reduced demand in the United States has also impacted unfavourably on 
the refinery in The Bahamas, production of which declined over the 
period, closing in 1985. Refinery throughput in the U.S. Virgin
9 Analysis of World Petroleum Refining - W. O. Mathius, Ottawa 
1980, quoted from Koulen, P. "Evaluation of Price Structure of 
Petroleum Products in CDCC countries" (ECIAC/UNDP).
10 Refinery capacity in thousands of barrels per day (tbpd)
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Islands has also declined consistently from 1978, resting in 1983 at 
40% of capacity. As mentioned, Trinidad and Tobago is no longer
refining inported crudes.
V. THE TOEM) TOWARDS SERVICES ECONOMIES
47. Services accounted, on average, for slightly over 50% of GDP in 
1974. The OECS countries generally display a higher than average 
contribution of services to GDP, notably being Antigua and Barbuda at 
82%, although Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia and 
Montserrat all average over 70%. Least oriented to services in 1974 
was Guyana with a 36% contribution. By 1984 the average contribution 
to GDP had increased to 65% although the dispersion of the data was 
reduced, for example, the percentage of Antigua and Barbuda falling to 
73% and in Guyana increasing to 46%. In all other countries, however, 
the shift towards services was noted.
48. Tourism is the single most important economic activity and the 
major source of hard currency for most Caribbean countries, with 
earnings amounting to nearly US$3 billion in 1985. It is also a major 
source of employment, although like many others, the industry has not 
established strong linkages with other domestic activities such as food 
production and furnishing and so does not maximize its contribution to 
the domestic product. It is being actively promoted by all CDCC 
countries except Guyana and Suriname. Since the industry depends on 
the disposable income of foreigners and is highly income elastic, 
tourism reflects, more than most other industries, the state of the 
economic activity in the countries from which the tourists originate. 
The industry is also very sensitive both to price and to socio­
political conditions in the host country, since potential visitors have 
numerous alternative resort-type options ad j acent to CDCC countries 
from which to choose.
49. Tourist arrivals CDCC countries increased to slightly over 50% 
between 1974 and 1984. Reported tourism earnings at current prices 
grew over the same period by about 150%.
50. The rapid growth in arrivals came to an abrupt halt by late 1980- 
1981 for all CDCC countries. A few countries such as The Bahamas, the 
Dominican Republic and Jamaica were able to resume growth by 1981 
although not until 1984 was a clear pattern of renewed growth pervasive 
throughout the region and this has been sustained to the present time. 
Overall the period 1980-1984 reflected the depressed state of the world 
economy, arrivals Increasing by only 11%.
51. While the bulk of tourists have tended to originate in North 
America, this characteristic was accentuated after 1980 with the rapid 
increase in disposable income in the United States. In addition to the 
slcwer economic recovery experienced by Western Europe, visitors 
originating in these countries had to contend with an appreciating U.S.
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dollar, to which the currencies of all the major destinations in the 
Caribbean are tied, thus making Caribbean vacations relatively more 
expensive. At the end of the survey period, therefore, the Caribbea 
had become more dependent upon the United States for its tourists, tha 
had been the case in 1974.
52. A preliminary sampling of gross tourist earnings suggests that 
they followed closely on the trend set by arrivals. For the period 
1974-1984, earnings are estimated to have increased by over 150%. The 
major gains were, however, accumulated between 1974-80 which averaged a 
growth in earnings of about 12.5% per annum. For the period 1980-1984 
the annual growth had, however, fallen to less than 7%.
53. This trend has continued to 1986 although the decline in the value 
of the U.S. dollar should make Caribbean vacations ones more attractive 
to other visitors.
54. Despite steady growth, however, the industry is not particularly 
well managed and will need to increase the operat ng efficiency 
particularly of the smaller hotels, as well as provide a more 
diversified product if it is to maximize its earnings and improve its 
viability. ■ .
55. Other services activities have grown however, such as off-shore 
banking, which in the Netherlands Antilles provides foreign revenue^ 
almost three times greater than foreign earnings from merchandise trade 
and provides 53% of the total revenues of the Government of the 
Netherlands Antilles. In The Bahamas, while the impact is not as great, 
the sector nevertheless makes a valuable contribution to the economy. 
Other Caribbean countries are also seeking to derive benefits from the 
provision of off-shore financial services.
56. Transportation services, such as ship registry and insurance, 
shiphandling, maintenance and repair, and trans-shipment facilities, 
are services from which the Netherlands Antilles also earns substantial 
returns, in 1985 net earnings from transportation services being more 
than twice the earnings from merchandise exports. More recent 
developments include computer services, whereby Barbados and Jamaica 
sell key punch and other data processing services to the United States. 
Another service industry with growth potential is that of health care, 
given the demographic profile of the U.S. population, and the emphasis 
on physical fitness, and it can be seen as an adjunct to the leisure 
industry which is already well established in the region.
57. While subject to rapid change and volatility, the Caribbean 
countries will continue to depend upon services as a useful source of 
employment and foreign earnings. Moreover, as the linkage between 
goods and services gets closer, the Caribbean will need to develop a 
range of services clustering around its export industries if it is to 
penetrate external markets, monitor their evolution and maximize the 
contribution of these industries to national development.
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V I. UaE VOLE OF OHE HJBLEC SECTOR
58. Public sector involvement in development is Often justified by the 
argument that as the process of development is not spontaneous, the 
impetus to it needs to be provided by the state. Whatever the merits 
of the assertion, it would be difficult to envisage a stable 
developmental process without a series of supporting measures which are 
considered to be the legitimate domain of the state. In this regard, 
there is little debate about the legitimate role of the public sector 
to provide a local and foreign environment which will permit its 
citizens to develop.
59. Domestically, this implies, as a minimum, a secure social 
environment with clearly defined rules that are consistent over time, a 
set of appropriate institutions through which the citizens may conduct 
their business, the provision of high standards of health, and 
education system that is supportive of the objectives of development, 
effective systems of communication, and the effective management of the 
economy.
i
60. In the international arena, it is recognized that the state has 
the legitimate responsibility to conduct its external policy so as to 
preserve the integrity and security of the country, and to enhance the 
climate in which external commercial activities will be efficiently 
conducted.
61. While the foregoing list of functions might be regarded as unduly 
restricted by seme, it nevertheless allows a great deal of leeway for 
the determination of policy. It moreover encompasses a series of tasks 
which are already beyond the resources of most developing countries.
t
62. The share of government services in GDP increased over the survey 
period from an average of about 16-19%. Government accounted for a 
greater share of GDP in the smaller countries in 1974 - Dominica (24%), 
Saint Lucia (22%), Montserrat (23%) and this characteristic prevailed 
in 1984 although for Montserrat, an exceptional case, the share had 
actually declined to 15%.
63. For the larger countries, Suriname recorded the highest 
contribution of government services to GDP exceeding all other 
countries for which data are available. Ihroughout the survey period, 
Guyana also recorded a consistent and significant increase as did 
Jamaica up to 1981, though it steadily declined thereafter to rest at a 
figure only marginally greater than that which prevailed in 1974. 
Increases were also recorded in Trinidad and Tobago though the 
percentage remained relatively low in 1984.
64. Prevailing policy perceptions in the subregion assign to the 
public sector a major responsibility for economic development. Ihis
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often implies the provision of infrastructure, a comprehensive 
bureaucratic apparatus, as well as involvement in directly productive 
activities. Such involvement has been prompted by the desire to 
increase local ownership and control or to prevent non-viable 
enterprises from failing, particularly when they are large employers of 
labour. Repayment of debt, which for some countries is now larger, 
also makes increasingly heavy demands upon revenues. Other reasons for 
the increase have been the relatively recent accession to independence 
of many CDCC countries with a consequent broadening of government 
responsibility, especially in the smaller countries; and an 
unwillingness to pass on the full cost of (sometimes inefficient) 
public utilities to the consumer. These policies are sometimes 
reinforced by the competing political parties bidding for public 
office.
65. Some member countries have a more formal commitment to public 
ownership, as is the case of Cuba, where the preponderance of economic 
activity is state-owned or in Guyana, where the proportion approaches 
80%. Participation by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago in the 
process of industrial development has increased over the survey 
period, with the need to find productive investments for rapidly 
growing public revenues, while in Jamaica, the level of state
involvement increased early in the survey period though it has declined 
somewhat since 1980.
66. Perusal of the data relating to public finance indicates that for 
most CDCC countries, government expenditures consistently exceed 
revenues. At the same time revenues have not kept pace with
expenditure increases, particularly after 1980, because of a generally 
stagnating economy, earnings, and sometimes inadequate tax-collection 
mechanisms. Needed tax reforms have until recently been postponed 
because of fears that in the short run, they will accentuate the trend 
towards declining revenues. This fear is often justified since 
indirect taxation is required to take a greater share of providing 
revenues, and they will decline whenever scarce foreign exchange
requires a reduction in consumer imports.
67. The prevailing pressures to increase capital expenditures serve to 
ensure that all CDCC countries accumulate fiscal deficits but for the 
most part, recurrent revenues were unable to cover recurrent
expenditures. The sole exception was Trinidad and Tobago which 
accumulated fiscal surpluses in all years from 1974 through to 1981, 
with the exception of 1979. From 1982, as a result of declining 
revenues from petroleum, Trinidad joined the remainder of CDCC 
countries to accumulate deficits.
68. For the remainder of the decade, Caribbean countries will need to 
devise ways to maximize the delivery of essential public services, 
given the contracting revenues available to them. They will need to 
delimit the role of the public sector to the effective provision of 
essentials and to ensure that state policies are carefully selected so 
as to be consistent with goals.
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69. lhe material and human constraints now being faced by the public 
sector are severe, attested to by the fact that most Caribbean 
governments are unable to meet their recurrent expenditures from their 
recurrent revenues (Table 3.1).
70. An automatic expansion of the public sector can no longer be 
assumed, and in the scenario of stagnating economies, governments now 
face constraints on their capacity to increase revenues, so that for 
the future it is likely that various measures will be explored to 
reduce the size of the public sector.
71. While it is generally recognized that there are many areas where 
the state needs to ensure that services are provided to the public, it 
is no longer universally assumed that the public sector need itself 
provide them. It has the option to subcontract these tasks to outside 
operators, often at a saving while having a greater supervisory role in 
ensuring the quality of the product or service. It is also generally 
accepted that there is a greater likelihood that inefficiency in the 
public sector will go unpenalized, and at public expense, for longer 
than in cases where it will have an essentially supervisory role.
72. A growing body of literature and of practice is being accumulated 
internationally and in the region on issues such as the economics of 
privatization; the checks and balances which may be used to overcome 
those abuses which may inhere in private sector monopolies; the 
distinction which can be made between the funding and the provision of 
a service; and the benefits which may accrue to strapped budgets from 
divestment. These new attitudes are encouraging a fresh and 
undoctrinaire look at the ways open to the public sector to achieve 
commonly accepted objectives without wasting its resources, the 
scarcest of which is managerial, in the actual task of implementation.
73. A reappraisal is also being made of the scope and type of planning 
which might be most effective in developing economies, especially those 
that are open, and therefore require speed and adaptability in their 
response to rapidly shifting global trends. Because of the complexity 
of issues and the levels of uncertainty inherent in global economic 
activity, there has grown a disenchantment with "traditional planning" 
and a new focus on "economic management". • In effect, the latter in its 
best case is mainly a recognition of the need to be more selective in 
its focus on key policy issues; to plan its strategies; to ensure that 
its incentive policies are consistent with goals; to secure a consensus 
between the various economic actors, both within the state apparatus, 
and in its dealings with the private sector; to manage the public 
investment programmes effectively; and to monitor and adjust the 
economy to the rapidly changing environment in which it operates.
74. Since the growth and even the survival of the economy is dependent 
upon trade, it is essential that the economy remains internationally 
competitive. The public sector has the responsibility to ensure that 
the necessary discipline is exercised by all the economic actors, 
including itself, so that competitiveness is adjusted and sustained
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over time. This will in turn enhance the flexibility and adaptability 
of the economy to unforeseen external events, and ultimately limit the 
extent to which external actors can intrude to influence domestic 
policy. In the current economic crisis where structural transformation 
is necessary, it also has a role to play in sustaining the main export 
enterprises while they move along the learning curve and become 
competitive in international markets.
t
75. A perusal of the balance of payments of CDCC countries shows that 
for most countries there is a persistent deficit on the current account 
of the balance of payments, a factor which constrains economic growth 
in most countries and emphasizes the crucial importance of effective 
export performance if Caribbean economies are to grow (Table 4.1).
VII. TRADE POLICY FOR A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY
76. The policy debate relating to the efficacy of the "open" or 
"closed" model of economic development, together with its corollary 
export promotion versus import substitution has continued in the 
Caribbean as it has elsewhere. Whatever the intrinsic merits of the 
case, and it may be argued that it is a false dichotomy, it is more 
difficult to sustain the case for closure in the subregion than might 
be the case elsewhere, due to che small size of Caribbean countries.
77. Small size implies a limited domestic market and a relatively 
narrow natural resource base. In the Caribbean, domestic markets are 
small, so that in most cases they are unable to absorb the output of 
modem enterprises, given the prevailing technologies. Moreover, 
resource endowments are narrow, so that at least in the initial stages, 
there will be an emphasis on relatively few productive activities. Hie 
situation is complicated by the fact that as most of the countries 
share similar assets and weaknesses, there is a tendency for them to 
possess a comparative advantage in similar activities. On the supply 
side therefore, they need to export a large part of their output, and 
they consequently export a similar range of goods and services which 
have to compete in the same markets, either in the developed countries 
or within the region.
78. On the demand side, the corollary is that while Caribbean 
countries export a narrow range of products they need to import the 
bulk of what they consume. Since this openness is a historical fact, 
there is a tendency by those advocating closure, to assume that it is 
determined by the political and consitutional arrangements of the past, 
and not by geography, and that it is therefore amenable to correction
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by political actions, consequently, this reliance11 on trade has not 
changed significantly in recent years.
79. For the smaller countries the CIF value of inports often exceeds 
80% of GDP. Conforming to this pattern are the following countries: 
Antigua and Barbuda; Belize; Dominica, which has moved from 70% in 1974 
to 82% by 1984; Saint Lucia, which recorded a decline over the period 
though still resting at 89%; and, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. 
Exceptions are registered for Montserrat, which declined from 80% in 
1974 to 65% in 1984; Grenada increasing its dependence from 57% in 1974 
to 69% in 1984,; and, Saint Christopher/Nevis, moving from 68% to 79%. 
The Netherlands Antilles, however, provides the classic example of a 
small trading country which with a buoyant refining industry in 1980 
had imports valued at five times the value of GDP.
80. Among other countries, declines in trade dependence were 
registered by Barbados, the Bahamas, Guyana, Suriname and Trinidad and 
Tobago, the latter shewing a significant decline from an average of 68% 
for the years 1970-73 to average 38% for the period 1981-83 and to fall 
further to 23% in 1984.
81. The three largest countries showed¡ the lowest dependence on 
imports, Cuba at 28%, Haiti 21% and the Dominican Republic at 18%.
82. All CDCC countries showed a reliance upon a few products for 
merchandise export earnings, which were derived mainly from sugar, 
bananas, bauxite/alumina, petroleum, coffee or cocoa. Dependence upon 
few export commodities was not, moreover, confined to the smallest 
states. Sugar sales in 1985 accounted for a high proportion of exports 
in Cuba (74%) and the Dominican Republic (21%) while coffee earned 22% 
of export earnings in Haiti. Among CARICOM countries the pattern was 
similar. At the end of the survey period petroleum products accounted 
for 82% of exports from Trinidad and Tobago, bauxite/alumina for 68% in 
Jamaica, 76% in Suriname and 43% in Guyana. Sugar accounted for 46% of 
export earnings in Belize, 35% in Guyana and bananas for 50% in Saint 
Lucia, 44% in Dominica and 21% in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. In 
Barbados, this dependency had shifted from primary commodities to 
manufactures, since electrical components in 1984 accounted for 57% of 
merchandise earnings although by 1986 this dependence had declined due 
to the collapse of that industry*
83. Exports of goods have not managed to keep pace with the demand for 
imports, and the merchandise trade deficit widened for the region 
between 1980-1985, by about 70%. All countries accumulated large and 
persistent deficits on merchandise trade account with the exception of 
Trinidad and Tobago (details are provided at Tables 5.1 - 5.3).
11 For illustrative purposes this dependence is defined as the 
relationship between inports (CIF) and GDP.
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84. While it is clear that effective development will diversify the 
range of outputs, it is also likely that a part or all of that new 
output will also need to be exported, so that in sum, a large 
proportion of output will need to be competitive on the international 
markets. Inport substitution is therefore, either a very limited or a 
very expensive option, the inefficiencies of which cannot for long be 
disguised. It is nevertheless recognized that in appropriate 
instances, production for the regional market might sustain an 
operation until it is strong enough to compete in the more competitive 
global markets. ïhe capacity of the state to recognize the constraints 
placed upon small islands, and to choose appropriate policies so as to 
permit the development of an efficient economy, is therefore crucial. 
This extreme openness carries with it a high sensitivity to external 
change and continually places the exporting country in a response 
posture to developments over which it has no control. This in turn 
requires a high degree of flexibility in planning and policy, both at 
the level of the state and of the enterprise.
85. Deriving from the practical realities which they face, Caribbean 
states have assiduously sought to provide as effective an institutional 
framework as possible within which to conduct its international trade. 
A number of special trade arrangements have accordingly been agreed 
with the main trading partners in the United States, the European 
Economic Community and Canada.
86. The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) which governs 
the terms under which most-*-2 Caribbean countries trade with the United 
States came into effect in August 1983. It provides duty free access 
for goods produced by beneficiary countries for a twelve-year period 
with the exception of seme goods deemed to be specially sensitive such 
as textile and apparel articles, leather goods not eligible under the 
General System of Preferences (GSP), canned tuna, petroleum and 
petroleum products, and watches and watch parts with materials from a 
non-MFN country.
87. Although few in number, the exclusions were nevertheless important 
in consequence, and have nullified much of the additional benefit which 
might have been derived over the GSP, since 87% of Caribbean exports 
had entered the U.S. market free of duty under the GSP. Moreover, the 
origin criteria were substantially the same as under the GSP, with 
additionality limited to the option of cumulating the inputs of other 
CBERA participarits. The exclusions therefore, placed limitations on 
participants in those areas in which they were likely to have the 
greatest potential for trade expansion. Concessions were therefore 
found necessary in February 1986, to increase the quotas under Article 
807 for garments assembled from cloth cut or woven in the United 
States, when it became clear that the hoped-for expansion in trade was 
not being realized.
12 Currently all CDCC members are participants in the CBERA with 
the exception of Cuba, Guyana and Suriname.
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88. Since the CBERA came into effect, sane products have shown an 
increased market penetration, such as furniture, electronics, seafood, 
winter fruits and vegetables, and garments. Some of the traditional 
exports have not fared as well, particularly sugar, since the existing 
quota arrangements had not been rescinded by the new act, and indeed 
quotas were significantly reduced. As a consequence, the overall value 
of trade with the U.S. has not grown under the CBERA, although some 
non-traditional exports have shown promise.
89. Most notable of the non-traditional exports have been electronics 
and garments, both of which have developed quite rapidly in some 
Caribbean countries in the enclave type of manufacturing arrangement, 
sometimes in free trade zones. These activities, which had started to 
grew in the 1970s, are not necessarily linked with the CBERA, and while 
making a useful contribution to employment, contribute only limited 
added value, and virtually no linkage within the economy itself.
90. It had been assumed by both parties to the agreement that 
increased market access would stimulate increased investment, which is 
the crucial need if the respective economies are to regain any 
momentum. A technical group to advise Caribbean governments estimated 
that private sector capital inflows of US$1,720 million would be needed 
in the CARICOM group, while US$543 million and US$242 million would be 
needed for the Dominican Republic and Haiti, respectively. In order to 
induce such investment, it was proposed that the existing double 
taxation agreements with the U.S. would need to be modified to include 
the reinvestment of profits, tax sparing clauses, greater flexibility 
in depreciating capital and tax deferrals. No modifications to 
taxation agreements have, however, been made under the CBERA, although 
bilateral investment treaties were briefly mooted. In February 1986, 
it was agreed that funds accumulating in the Puerto Rican Development 
Bank under Law 93613 could be used for investment in the other 
Caribbean countries and it was hoped that this would speed up the 
development of twin plants whereby Puerto Rican firms would subcontract 
some of their inputs to other Caribbean countries.
91. It is still too soon to arrive at any definitive conclusions, 
although it seems that the expectations relating to new investment 
flows are not being realized, and that economic reactivation and 
transformation will not be possible without a rapid growth in 
investment.
13 Law 936 provides that profits accumulated by US companies 
operating in Puerto Rico will be exempt from tax if held locally and 
reinvested in that country, and an estimated US$8 billion have 
accumulated over time. While there have been attempts to repeal the 
law, a successful lobby was mounted to retain it on condition that a 
portion of these funds, an estimated 10% held in the Government 
Development Bank, would be used in the Caribbean in "twin-plant" 
arrangements.
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92. Ihe Lamé Convention which came into force in April 1976, and to 
which the English-speaking Caribbean countries and Suriname are 
signatories, was originally envisaged as an arrangement to protect 
established marketing arrangements for traditional exports of 
participating countries, particularly to the United Kingdom on its 
accession to the EEC. It also extended duty free access for most 
originating products to the EEC. Other elements of interest included 
mechanisms for stabilizing export earnings, and for fostering 
industrial, financial and technical co-operation.
93. Since the first Lomé Convention was signed it has been revised 
twice, the lomé III Convention being signed in December 1984, and valid 
for a period of five years. Perhaps the most significant departure 
from previous conventions is the provision of a section dealing with 
investments, capital movements, establishment, and services since the 
arrangements for access have been largely unexploited because of 
inadequate supply. The new provisions are therefore a recognition of 
these supply constraints and an attempt to encourage EEC investment 
into the region.
94. A new agreement - CARIBCAN - is also in the process of being 
implemented between CARICOM member states and Canada. Its provisions 
are likely to include duty free access for all originating products, so 
defined to qualify a product having a local value added of 60% of the 
ex-factory price, with inputs from Canada to count as a part of the 
local value. Exceptions to the duty free provision relate to areas of 
potential production in the Caribbean, in textiles, clothing, footwear, 
luggage, handbags, leather garments, lubricating oils, and methanol. 
There is not likely to be a clause relating to investment promotion, 
despite a request, although provisions are likely to be made for trade 
promotion and training.
95. In summary, the special trading arrangements are an attempt in the , 
first instance, to protect traditional exports, secondly to secure 
market access for as wide a range of potential exports as possible, and 
latterly to formalize seme arrangement which would foster investment 
and increased output, and also make provisions for marketing 
assistance. The efforts have been partly successful in that 
traditional exports which were no longer comparative and which were 
under pressure from substitutes were given a longer adjustment period 
in which to switch production to alternative products. The adjustment 
process has not been smooth, and has, in some cases been hindered by 
arranged prices in excess of those prevailing in the market since seme 
producers were reluctant to switch from products which had once more 
became remunerative.
96. Increased access to markets has highlighted the production 
constraints, and in those products having export potential brought home 
the reality of having to fight a continuous battle against various non­
tariff barriers, and the complexity of marketing and distribution faced 
by very small producers. Investment provisions conceived in the
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framework of joint ventures are intended to try to circumvent these 
constraints, as well as to relieve a general paucity of domestic 
investment. Yet the trading arrangements which were in same cases 
unilateral, and not legally binding, were subject to arbitrary 
readjustment so that the element of risk was not significantly reduced 
for potential investors. Moreover, there is cause to believe that sane 
domestic regulations act as a disincentive to investment, both local 
and foreign, and might in fact encourage capital flight. The 
encouragement of an effective investment regime within the ambit of 
CARIOCM might, however, encourage Caribbean investors to pursue the 
rational option of diversifying their investment portfolios while 
retaining the benefits of such investment for the region as a whole.
VIH. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EXTERNAL DEBT
97. One of the most obvious and dramatic manifestations of the 
economic crisis faced by Caribbean countries is its growing external 
debt. For a variety of reasons, the international developments of the 
past decade have not impacted upon all Caribbean countries in the same 
ways, neither have all the countries had, 'at their disposal, the same 
options nor the same policy responses to them. For instance, the OECS 
countries have at their disposal fewer means to cope with economic 
downturns, so that adjustment has been almost automatic and sudden, and 
ameliorated primarily by transfusions of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA).
98. In many of the member countries of the OECS, ODA has traditionally 
been necessary in order to meet the recurrent costs of government as 
well as to initiate capital development. In the case of the former 
this was previously financed by United Kingdom grants-in-aid, but in 
recent years greater recourse is being made to the local banking 
system, and to a lesser extent to the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank 
(ECCB) ; and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
9 9 . Capital programmes have been financed by grants from the 
traditional donor countries, mainly through the OGCED, and soft loans 
from the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), the European Development 
Fund (EDF), Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela.
100. It should be noted that while efforts need to be made to increase 
revenue, the base from which this must be extracted is small and 
fragile, and in ahy case the performance is not bad, the ratio of 
government revenue to GDP being on average over 25%. The situation in 
fact provides a good example of the diseconomies of scale faced by 
small states, as there is a level beyond which the apparatus of 
government may not be easily compressed. Only through increased 
productive activity can the dilemma be resolved.
101. While the very smallest countries have been spared the worst 
effects that a large external debt would have on current and future
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economic development, it is nevertheless becoming a source of concern 
for these countries, and is growing. While the overall magnitudes may 
not seem to be large for the debt or debt service payments (Tables 6.1 
and 6.2 respectively) a better indicator of the relative magnitude of 
the debt is provided when it is compared to the GDP (Table 6.3). The 
difficulty in servicing the debt in any one year is also better 
illustrated when it is compared to the export earnings for that year 
(Table 6.4).
102. At the same time these countries have limited flexibility in 
rearranging their repayments schedules since the debt is owed primarily 
to international financial institutions which have so far shown limited 
flexibility in rearranging their debt schedules.
103. All Caribbean countries have not been spared the worst effects of 
the debt crisis, however, the larger and hitherto more "credit-worthy" 
of them have accumulated sizeable external debts, which in 1985 reached 
72% of GDP for the Dominican Republic, 177% of GDP for Jamaica, ant 
239% of GDP for Guyana. In order to service the debt in the same yea; 
the Dominican Republic was required to earmark 17% of its exporl 
earnings, Haiti was required to earmark 19%, Cuba over 32% and Jamaica 
almost 37%14. 1
104. The current debt crisis has its genesis in the mid-1970s and 
reflected a decision by governments to use external financing, which 
was then available at negative real interest rates, to cushion the 
shocks caused by rapid oil price increases, and hopefully to allow 
effective demand to be maintained while increasing economic growth. By 
the early 1980s greatly increased interest rates created severe 
problems for debtor countries, problems which were increased when the 
banks decided to reduce their exposure and so curtail lending in the 
region. Subsequently, although interest rates have fallen they remain 
at high real rates aid any amelioration of the debt service burden has 
been nullified by weak demand and rapidly eroding terms of trade for 
the raw materials exported from the region. The continuing curtailment 
of domestic demand in order to generate surpluses to meet debt 
obligations has the effect of postponing the reactivation and 
transformation of the econanies in the region.
105. Some positive conceptual and practical developments have taken 
place in the treatment of the debt issue such as: the récognition that 
development needs to te sustained and not curtailed by net financial 
flows; the growing acceptance that external finance should be linked in 
some way to a country’s main export commodities; a series of 
rescheduling arrangements which have reduced the short-term debt 
service burden; and a secondary market for the purchase of discounted 
debt certificates or for them to be converted into equity.
14 For Cuba the discussion relates to earnings from goods and 
services in freely eorivertible currencies, and debt contracted in 
freely convertible currencies.
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106. Despite these developments, the debt continues to be a major 
obstacle to economic activation and transformation, especially at a 
time when massive investment:, and particularly investment which is 
foreign exchange intensive, is required to transform these economies. 
Moreover, interest rates are still high in real terms despite the 
decline in nominal rates; and the smaller debtors which have reduced 
bargaining power, are subject to more stringent credit conditions than 
the major debtors, despite the fact that in relative terms the burden 
of the debt is extremely severe.
IX. REGIONAL INTECRATICN - A DEFENSE AGAINST 
THE GD3BAL CRESTS?
107. A major argument for Caribbean regional integration derives from 
the belief thát a widening of the protected Caribbean market will 
compensate for some of the disadvantages of very small size. Paramount 
among these disadvantages is an acute vulnerability to the rapid and 
unpredictable changes in the global economy. An evaluation of Caricom 
performance, however, shews only limited success in meeting this 
objective, due to some weaknesses in the structure of production of 
member countries, as well as seme institutional weaknesses in the 
integration movement itself, notably a lack of adequate arrangements to 
finance regional trade.
108. Common historic and cultural bonds have traditionally existed 
between the English-speaking Caribbean countries deriving from common 
constitutional practice, close proximity and some limited institutional 
co-operation15. Such was the perceived strength of these bonds that a 
Federation was established in 1958 with the expectation that it would 
provide the most viable basis on which the several small islands could 
face the future. The Federation was, however, not long lived and was 
dissolved in 1962.
109. While the political and constitutional implications of Federation 
were not acceptable to all members, the idea of economic co-operation 
was more generally accepted so that a number of regional institutions 
developed soon after. The Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA), 
and the East Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) were formed in 1968. In 
1969 the Caribbean Development Bank was formed and commenced operations 
in 1970 and in 1973 the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) 
were established.
15 For the purposes of this discussion, the thirteen states, 
members of CARICOM are being treated except in that section relating to 
the widening of the integration movement.
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110. While the central focus of CARICOM remained trade and economic co­
operation through the workings of the Common Market, and with the 
ultimate goal of economic integration retaining, two additional aspects 
were included, functional co-operation and the co-ordination of foreign 
policy.
111. During the life of CARIFEA intraregional trade among its members 
increased from 5% to 10% of total trade. CARICOM, however, came into 
being at a time when member countries began to face great instability 
in their external accounts due to rapidly increasing petroleum prices, 
and subsequently, declining prices for their export commodities. 
Despite the provisions made for a common external tariff, for the joii 
development of agriculture, the establishment of regional industrie 
programming, for the movement of capital and for a harmonized scheme of 
fiscal incentives, the integration movement faced severe impediments 
since many of the mechanisms agréai were only partially implemented, 
and intraregional trade declined, with intra-CARIOCM imports falling by 
25% between 1981 and 1985.
112. Since CARICOM production was based on the assembly of articles 
which had traditionally been imported but now using imported inputs, 
they were still significant users, and often net users of foreign 
exchange. Moreover, excess capacity had developed in the region so 
that as trade contracted with the general decline of the economies, the 
contraction was exacerbated by the implementation of quotas and other 
non-tariff barriers in an attempt to preserve foreign exchange and 
protect domestic manufactures.
113. As a consequence of developments over the past decade, the 
regional integration movement faces a number of challenges which it 
must meet if it is to continue to contribute to the economic 
development of the region. Briefly stated, it must in the short run 
find the means to resuscitate intraregional trade, but in the longer 
run it must incorporate policies to stimulate the rapid growth of 
extraregional trade. It must reactivate those mechanisms agreed in 
principle, but which have not been implemented in practice, which would 
allow the stimulation of regional agricultural development, the 
resuscitation of the textiles industry, and the rationalization of the 
industrial sector. It must adept measures that will stimulate regional 
investment.
114. In so far as the structure of the movement is concerned, it will 
need to satisfy the smaller states that measures are being taken to 
provide a more equitable balance between the costs and benefits of 
intraregional trade, it will need to devise a more effective decision- 
making machinery, and ultimately, it will need to face the question of 
widening the membership from the current 5.5 million persons to include 
other Caribbean countries.
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115. CARICOM has started to move to meet the challenge; the creation of 
an export credit facility to resuscitate CARICOM trade has been agreed 
by member governments, to be activated by mid-1987; the integration 
mechanisms are not seen as an alternative to structural adjustment but 
as a complement to it, and thJ Nassau Accord on Structural Adjustment 
was agreed under the auspices of the CARICOM Heads of Government
Meeting in 1984. It is recognized that regional trade will need in
future to develop with a greater openness to the external market, and 
the existing fiscal incentives are being revised to make them more 
broadly applicable, more competitive, and more easily understood. It 
has been agreed in principle that the Common External Tariff (CET) 
should form the principal means of protection, that it should be 
designed to encourage regional production and therefore be structured 
to keep the costs of production and the necessary services inputs low, 
and that national quantitative restrictions should be de-emphasized. 
It was also agreed that export promotion efforts should be increased 
and that exchange rates should be adjusted to maintain the
competitiveness of the region.
116. Applications by Suriname, Haiti and the Dominican Republic for 
membership or for observer status in CARICOM are longstanding.
Suriname was granted liaison status in 1973, and has participated in a 
number of meetings of functional committees since then. Application 
for membership was received from Haiti in 1974, subsequently changed to 
observer status in 1982, the same year in which a similar request was 
received from the Dominican Republic. At present these three 
applicants have observer status in the meetings of Standing Committees 
of Ministers of Health, Education, Agriculture and Labour, and joint 
technical groups have been established to identify areas of greater 
collaboration. While the subject of widening is being given serious 
study by the secretariat, the internal difficulties experienced in the 
Common Market have hindered further progress in this direction, and 
prompted some governments to advocate solving the existing internal 
problems before widening the grouping.
117. Despite the difficulties being experienced by regional integration 
movements worldwide, and in this respect CARICOM is not an exception, 
it nevertheless remains one of the few options over which the 
participating developing countries have a great measure of control. 
Since it has the capability to increase the size of the home market, it 
has been able to assist the development process in the past and could 
assist Caribbean countries to reactivate their economies, increase 
their bargaining capacity, and penetrate export markets, if appropriate 
policies are devised for the future.
Table 1.1












Average l i f e  
growth<4> expectar 
1980-85 1985
Antigua/Barbuda 440 79 689 2244 6.00 72
Bahamas 13940 234 3362 7822 4.73 69
Barbados 430 252 1296 4894 0.29 72
Belize 22960 159 614 1110 1.16 66
Cuba<2><3> 110860 10097 1524 2690 6.07 75
Dominica 750 78 378 1132 5.64 74
Dominican Republic 49000 6261 639 712 1.83 64
Grenada , 340 96 346 961 3.11 69
Guyana 214970 806 538 584 -2.88 66
H aiti 28000 5451 125 368 1.16 55
Jamai ca 10990 2227 1038 858 -0.87 73
St. Christopher/Nevis 270 43 634 1469 2.86 63
Saint Lucia 620 136 448 1245 2.97 69
St.Vincent/Grenadines 340 119 310 933 4.87 70
Suriname 163265 393 1100 2360 0.34 65
Trinidad/Tobago 5130 1187 1778 6538 -2.04 69
B ritis h  V irg in  Islands 150 12 . . . 7101 5.22
Montserrat 100 12 886 3118 3.45 63
Netherlands A n tille s 993 264 . . . 6110 . . . 71
U.S. V irg in  Islands 344 - 111 . . . 9280 . . . " 69
Source: ECLAC; IBRD; CDB.
<1> GDP in US$ at market prices 
<2> Global Social Product in Pesos 
<3> Refers to 1975
<4> Average growth of GDP at constant prices
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Tabic 2 .1
CDCC COUNTRIES GROSS 00MEST1C PRODUCT AT FACTOR COST 
(C onstan t p r i  .58 in  n a tio n a l  cu rren c y  m il l io n s )
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 . 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
A ntigua/B arbuda 154 145 132 142 153 166 176 193 194 206 2 2 0 235Bahamas «1» 622 662 696 719 764 786 758 726 776 929 1 0 1 2 1019
Barbados 640 627 655 679 712 769 802 787 748 751 778 780
B e lize 101 111 111 117 124 126 129 131 130 13) 132 135Cuba<2> . . . . . . . . . 18910 19202 19109 22173 23024 24153 25921 27168Dominica 89 93 97 84 95 79 92 99 1 0 0 103 107 109
Dominican R epublic 1984 2085 1173 2270 2351 2816 2973 3079 3148 3194 3205 3135Grenada 96 1 0 2 106 111 115 117 125 134 141 137 135 140Guyana 941 1032 1050 1013 990 996 992 989 8 8 6  ■ 804 821 829
H a iti 4009 4053 4210 4235 4447 4786 5108 4961 4781 4827 4847 5106Jam aica 2170 2155 2013 I960 1986 1957 1851 1889 ' 1893 1931 1924 1853S t .  C h ri9 to p h er/N ev is 71 72 78 81 8 6 92 8 8 91 92S t .  Lucia 146 148 157 178 184 183 184 192 197 207 219S t . V incen t/G renad ines 67 71 74 84 91 96 103 109 114 118 1 21Suriname 632 569 628 730 810 797 771 814 830 847 844 811trin id a d /T o b a g o 1799 1924 2126 2377 2565 2701 2899 2795 3007 2771 2417 2346B r i t i s h  V irg in  I s la n d s . . . . . . 24 26 29 34 34 35 37 39 39M o n tse rra t 28
i
28 27 30 32 35 37 38 36 37 39
SOURCE: Economic a c t i v i t y  in  C aribbean  c o u n tr ie s -v a r io u s  is s u e s ;  d a ta  su p p lie d  ECLAC
<1> ECLAC e s t im a te s




CDCC COUNTRIES GROWTH OF G.D.P. 1980-1985 
(Percentage change)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Av.80-85
Antigua 6 .0 9 .7 0.5 6 .2 6 .8 6 .8 6.00
Bahamas -3 .6 -4 .2 6 .9 19.8 8 .9 0 .6 4.73
Barbados 4 .3 -1 .9 -5 .0 0.4 3 .6 0.3 0.29
Belize 2.4^ 1.6 -0 .8 0 .8 0 .8 2 .3 1.16
Cuba<1> -0 .5 16.0 3 .8 4 .9 7.3 4 .8 6.07
Dominica 16.5 7.6 1.0 3.0 3 .9 1.9 5.64
Dorn. Rep 5.6 3 .6 2.2 1.5 0.3 -2 .2 1.83
Grenada 6.8 7.2 5.2 -2 .8 -1 .5 3 .7 3.11
Guyana -0 .4 -0 .3 -10 .4 -9 .3 2.1 1.0 -2.88
H a iti 6 .7 -2 .9 -3 .6 1.0 0.4 5.3 1.16
Jamaica -5 .4 2.1 0.2 2.0 -0 .4 -3 .7 -0 .87
S t.K its /N 3 .8 6.2 7.0 -4 .3 3.4 1.1 2.86
S t. Lucia -0 .5 0.5 4 .3 2 .6 5.1 5 .8 2.97
St. Vinct 5.5 7.3 5 .8 4 .6 3.5 2.5 4.87
Sur i name -3 .3 5 .6 2 .0 2.0 -0 .4 -3 .9 0.34
T'dad/Tob 7.3 -3 .6 7.6 -7 .8 -12.8 -2 .9 -2.04
Br V Is 17.2 0 .0 2 .9 5 .7 5.4 0 .0 5.22
Montserrt 9.4 5 .7 2 .7 -5 .3 2.8 5.4 3.45
Source: ECLAC derived from national data
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t Table 3.1
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE t  EXPENDITURE ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
In  n a tio n a l  c u rren c y  ( m il l io n s )










S t .  C h ris to p h e r/N e v is  
S t .  Lucia
S t .  V in cen t/G ren ad in es 
Suriname 
Trin idad /T obago  
B r i t i s h  V irg in  I s la n d s  
M o n tse rra t
- 1 1 -7
1 0 7 8
-1 24 -3
5 1 0 6
-4 -3 - 1








- 1 -1 Ò
- 1 1 -7 - 1 0
9 - -25
5 '  " 41 38
3 9 i. . ,
- 1 2 -7 -15
1 - 2 - 1




3 - 2 - 6
-46 -31 . .
1818 1600 1879
. .  a > • • 4
1 - 1 0
-4 -9 -18
36 38 1 2
38 19 15
. . 4 -9
-13 - 6 -5
- 2 - 1 3
-185 -269 -186
. . . . . . -837
-587 -175 -380
. . . - 2 -5
3
-3 2 3












-325 -1016 J 1065
-5 -5 - 1 2
- 8 -3 -5
- 1 13 23




Source: Economic A c t iv i ty  in  C aribbean  c o u n tr ie s  - v a r io u s  i s s u e s ;  D ata s u p p lie d  ECLAC; IMF/IBRD.
EXTERNAL BALANCE ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
In  n a tio n a l  cu rren cy  ( m il l io n s )
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
AntiguaXBarbuda - 2 0 -29 -17 -26 - 6
Bahamas -70 59 67 6 6 42
Barbados -98 -84 -128 -103 -63
B e li te -32 -39 -50 -38 -32
Cuba<1> 11 -161 -487 -543 -523
Dominica -7 -9 -7 -9 - 1 2Dominican Republic<2> -245 -78 -247 -132 -315
Grenada - 8 - 1 2 - 2 - 1 2 - 1 2
Guyana -17 -32 -351 -251 -72
H a iti< 2 > -36 -40 -47 -82 -84
Jamaica<2> -167 , -283 -303 -35 -87
S t .  C h ris to p h er/N e v is . . . -3 - 1 -1
S t .  Lucfa -24 -18 -31 -63
S t .  V incen t/G ren ad in es -3 -15 6
Suriname -41 -85 -24 -145 . -82
T rin idad/T obago 407 599 449 . m 187
M o n tse rra t -3 -3 i -3
N eth erlan d s A n t i l l e s -67 154 97 , -47
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
-54 -97 -136 - 1 0 2 -19 -41 -70
17 -14 -74 -63 -35 -48 -50
-48 -75 -172 -83 - 1 0 2 35 34
-59 -26 -24 -18 -30 -15 -32
-139 -46 51 297 263 - 2 1 2 -140
-25 -55 -58 - 1 0 -9 -16 -4
-360 -675 -415 -456 -441 -223 -317
-40 -36 -63 -91 -81 -75 -81
-208 -256 -475 -426 -468 -373 -349
-92 -140 -225 -160 -177 -182 -191
-143 -175 -337 -388 -480 -297 -401
-3 - 1 0 -9 - 1 2 -17 - 1 1 - 1 2
-75 -90 .-107 -82 -89 - 1 0 2 -105
-14 -36 - 2 2 -27 -23 - 1 2 -23
- 6 6 -104 -219 -274 -292 -80 - 4 4
51 946 751 -1839 -2462 -1344 -156
- 6 - 1 0 -14 -13 - ■ -7 -7 -7
34 - 8 1 1 0 342 143 164
Source: Economic A c t iv i ty  in  C aribbean c o u n tr ie s  - v a r io u s  is s u e s ;  d a ta  su p p lie d  ECLAC; IMF/IBRD 
<)> B alance on c u r r e n t  account in  f r e e ly  c o n v e r t ib le  c u r re n c ie s  
<2» In  m il l io n s  o f U .S . d o l la r s
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Table 5.1
CDCC COUNTRIES - MERCHANDISE TRADE (USSm) 
exports - f .o .b .
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Ant i gua/Barbuda 59.5 51.4 49.3 37.8 37.2 37.0
Bahamas <1> 135.1 151.8 181.6 210.0 236.6 285.1
Barbados 228.8 193.0 258.2 322.1 393.2 353.9
Belize 110.8 119.0 91.0 77.6 93.1 90.0
Cuba <2> 3967.0 4224.0 4940.0 5535.0 5462.0 5983.0
Dominica 10.1 19.7 25.1 27.8 26.1
Dominican Republic 962.0 1188.0 768.0 785.0 868.0 739.0
Grenada 17.4 19.0 18.5 18.8 16.7 22.5
Guyana 389.1 344.7 251.5 193.3 217.6 214.1
H a iti 216.0 150.0 174.0 186.0 199.0 223.0
Jamaica 962.7 973.9 767.4 685.7 745.3 568.6
S t. Christopher/Nevis 24.1 25.3 21.0 18.7 20.5 18.7
S t. Lucia 46.0 41.2 41.6 47.5 47.8 52.0
S t. Vincent/Grenadines’ 21.0 29.8 34.3 41.8 54.2 63.7
Suriname 514.4 469.8 425.1 363.7 361.6 311.6
Trinidad/Tobago 4077.0 3760.8 3071.8 2023.0 2106.3 2160.5
B ritis h  V irg in  Islands 1.2 2 .0 1.2 3.1 3.1 3 .2
Montserrat 1.2 2.2 2.6 4 .6 3 .2 2.9
Netherlands Antilles<3> 146.1 147.3 115.6 51.9 75.9 75.6
Source: ECLAC; IBRD.
<1> Excludes the o il  trade 
<2> Pesos (m)
<3> Based on cash flows
Table 5.2
CDCC COUNTRIES - MERCHANDISE TRADE <US$m) 
Imports - c . i . f .
- 3 2 -
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Antigua/Barbuda 126.2 137.8 139.4 108.9 131.8 147.5
Bahamas <1> 676.5 432.9 664.5 591.3 717.3 808.76
Barbados 524.6 575.5 553.7 624.6 662.2 610.9
Belize 120.9 117.7 102.2 99.3 111.2 102.4
Cuba <2> 4627 5114 5537 6222 7204 7905
Dominica 53.2 49.7 47.5 47.1 55.3
Dominican Republic 1520 1452 1257 1282 1257 1286
Grenada 60.3 70.2 77.6 74.2 70.7 81.6
Guyana 396.1 440 280.4 248.3 214.3 262.2
H a iti 319 358 296 324 325 345
Jamaica 1171.3 1472.6 1381.1 1281.1 1183.2 1143.6
St. Christopher/Nevis 44.8 47.6 44.3 51.4 51.9 53.6
S t. Lucia 123.8 129.2 118.1 106.8 118.5 125
St. Vincent/Grenadines 57.2 58.2 63.6 70.4 76.6 85.5
Suriname 504 563.2 511.8 446.5 342.9 296
Trinidad/Tobago » 3177.5 3124.5 3697.1 ,2510.9
A
1915.7 1552.9
B ritis h  V irg in  Islands 40.5 49.8 58.5 67.1 69.6 72
Montserrat 16.5 18.9 20.3 20.1 17.5 18.3
Netherlands Antilles<3> 903.7 868.8 921 833.3 788.9 832
Source: ECLAC; IBRD.
<1> Excludes the o i l  trade  
<2> Pesos (m)
<3> Based on cash flows

















B ritish  V irg in  Islands 
Montserrat
Netherlands A n tille s  <3>
Source: ECLAC; IBRD.
<1> Excludes the o il  trade 
<2> Pesos (m)
<3> Based on cash flows
CDCC COUNTRIES - MERCHANDISE TRADE (US$m> 
Merchandise trade balance
Tab le  5 .3
1980 1981 1982





-43.1 -30 .0 -22.4
-558.0 -264.0 -489.0
-42 .9 -51.2 -59.1
-7 .0 -95 .3 -28 .9
-103.0 -208.0 -122.0
-208.6 -498.7 -613.7
-20 .7 -22.3 -23.3
-77 .8 -88 .0 -76.5
-36 .2 -28 .4 -29.3
10.4 -93 .4 -86 .7
899.5 636.3 -625.3
-39.3 -47 .8 -57 .3
-15 .3 -16 .7 -17 .7
-757.6 -721.5 -805.4
1983 1984 1985
-71.1 -94 .6 -110.5
-381.3 -480.7 -523.7
-302.5 -269.0 -257
-21 .7 -18.1 -12.4
-687.0 -1742.0 -1922
-19.3 -29 .2 -29 .2
-497.0 -389.0 -547




-32 .7 -31 .4 -34 .9
-59.3 -70 .7 -73
-28 .6 -22 .4 -21 .8
-82 .8 18.7 15.6
-487.9 190.6 607.6
-64 .0 -66.5 68.8
-15.5 -14 .3 -15.4
-781.4 -713.0 -756.4
Table 6.1
EXTERNAL DEBT - CDCC COUNTRIES (US$m) 
Debt outstanding a t end of period <1>
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1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Antigua/Barbuda 45.5 76.6 84.4 88.7 57.6 75.8
Bahamas 98.0 159.5 228.1 233.9 212.8 193.2
Barbados 81.9 129.7 143.5 173.6 182.6 222.1
Belize 49.2 56.6 63.1 68.4 70.0 87.9
Cuba<2> 3227.0 3170.0 2669.0 2790.0 2989.0 3259.0
Dominica 17.7 24.1 34.3 40.1 42.7 45.0
Dominican Republic 1851.2 2035.7 2316.0 2924.6 3024.4 3184.1
Grenada 14.4 26.2 33.7 48.4 48.4 49.6
Guyana 559r4 639.0 683.4 699.2 694.5 742.7
H a iti 290.0 372.0 410.0 551.0 607.0 599.0
Jamaica 1734.0 2212.0 269Ó.0 2920.0 3207.0 3355.0
S t. Christopher/Nevis 10.0 11.4 11.4 12.0 17.1 19.8
S t. Lucia 18.2 20.4 25.5 27.4 26.2 28.7
S t. Vincent/Grenadines 17.0 19.2 20.5 22.0 22.6 29.3
Trinidad/Tobago 436.6 447.9 557.5 646.2 838.8 954.0
Montserrat 1.5 2.0 2.4 2.7 3 .6 3 .7
Source: IMF; IBRD; ECLAC




EXTERNAL DEBT - CDCC COUNTRIES (USim) 
Debt Service payments
I 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Antigua/Barbuda 6.7 7.0 10.6 10.2 7.4 11.0
Bahamas 29.3 54.5 44.2 40.8 54.9 51.6
Barbados 11.0 14.0 17.0 21.0 23.0 30.0
Belize 1.6 2-3 3 .9 4.0 5 .0 14.3
Dominica 0 .6 1.1 1.4 2.6 4.1 4 .2
Dominican Republic 153.7 229.1 256.5 221.4 167.0 220.0
Grenada 1.6 1.5 2.4 2 .6 7.2 10.4
Guyana 69.5 79.6 47.6 52.1 38.5 25.0
H a iti 15.0 16.0 17.0 23.0 36.0 64.0
Jamaica 263.0 437.8 408.4i 371.4 394.8 448.4
S t. Christopher/Nevis 0.5 0 .6 0 .7 0 .7 1.1 1.5
S t. Lucia 1.4 1.3 2.0 1.8 2 .0 2.5
S t. Vincent/Grenadines ■** 1.5 1.5 1.7 2.3 3 .2
Trinidad/Tobago 199.2 74.5 75.8 179.0 145.8 180.8
Montserrat 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4
Source: ECLAC, IBRD, CCLAC, IBRD, CDB.
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EXTERNAL DEBT - CDCC COUNTRIES (US$m) 
Debt as a percentage of GDP<1>
Table 6.3
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Antigua/Barbuda 50.0 74.2 72.1 65.9 37.3 42.8
Bahamas 8.4 12.9 16.2 13.4 10.8 9 .3
Barbados 9.5 13.6 14.4 16.4 15.9 18.3
B elize i l  5 36.1 42.7 44.4 44.5 46.1
Dominica 33.2 42.6 57.1 60.8 58.2 59.6
Dominican Republic 31.8 33.6 36.9 47.6 56.6 71.6
Grenada 24.2 35.1 43.7 58.7 53.9 51.6
Guyana 143.1 181.0 206.3 224.5 226.7 239.1
H a iti 20.5 26.2 28.6 34.7 34.2 29.8
Jamaica 66.8 86.3 83.5 84.6 144.5 177.6
St. Christopher/Nevis 26.2 24.4 21.6 23.5 31.5 34.4
S t. Lucia 18.1 18.9 21.9 22.5 20.0 19.9
S t. Vincent/Grçnadines 34.8 31.5 29.4 29.1 28.2 34.7
Trinidad/Tobago 6.8 6 .4 6 .6 7.8 10.5 10.8
Montserrat 7.0 8.5 9 .2 9.4 11.8 11.4
Source: Data derived by ECLAC 




EXTERNAL DEBT - CDCC COUNTRIES (UStm) 
(Debt service ra tio  <1>)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Antigua\Barbuda 6 .3 6 .5 9 .3 9 .2 5 .0 8 .9
Bahamas 2 .6 4 .8 3 .9 3 .3 4 .2 3 .4
Barbados 1.9 2.4 2 .8 2 .8 2 .9 3 .8
Belize 1.4 2 .3 4.4 4.3 4 .8 14.4
Dominica 4.1 4 .8 4 .9 7.9 10.1 '14.1
Dominican Republic 12.1 15.1 22.5 17.8 12.2 16.7
Grenada 4.1 3 .7 6.3 6 .8 17.9 20.3
Guyana 17.0 21.7 18.0 23.1 15.6 10.2
H a iti 4 .9 6 .7 6.3 8 .0 12.0 18.7
Jamaica 18.5 29.2 29.3 27.9 28.6 40.9
S t. Christopher/Nevis 1.1 1.0 1.4 1.7 2.3 2.9
S t. Lucia 1.8 1.9 2 .8 2.5 2.3 2 .7
S t. Vincent/Grenadines . . . 3.4 3.1 3.1 3 .3 4.1
Trinidad/Tobago t 5 .8 2.2 2.5 6 .8 5.5 6 .2
Montserrat 4.1 2.4 3.5 2 .6 8.3 9 .8
Source: IMF; IBRD; ECLAC; OECS/EAS
<1> Debt service as a percentage of earnings from 
exports and services
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